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LUBRIZOL: WHAT WILL IT MEAN FOR THE
SOFTWARE INDUSTRY?
James E. Meadows*
I. INTRODUCTION
Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.1
has some serious overtones for vendors and vendees of computer
software. The Lubrizol court permitted a bankrupt licensor of a
metal coating process technology to reject its nonexclusive license2
to a licensee.3 Although the decision does not specifically mention
computer software, its applicability to software is apparent in sev-
eral situations. For example, the case could be extended to most
OEM/VAR 4 agreements because such agreements typically provide
for continuing duties by both parties.5 The analysis could also be
extended to sales of custom software products with continuing
maintenance obligations on vendor and vendee license fees based on
usage. If Lubrizol is construed to apply to the above situations, its
greatest impact will be felt by small software vendors attempting to
license software in the future and by current vendees who have
based a significant portion of their businesses upon software li-
Copyright © 1987 James E. Meadows. All Rights Reserved.
* B.S. 1983, University of North Carolina; J.D. 1986, Wake Forest University. The
author is an associate with the Croton-On-Hudson, New York law firm of Paul S. Hoffman,
P.C., a firm specializing in software ownership and contracting matters. He wishes to ex-
pressly thank Paul Hoffman and Julie Rosso for their assistance with this paper.
1. Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc., v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1285 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1986) (No. 85-863).
2. A nonexelusive license is one which grants use permission to a licensee while not
limiting the licensor's rights to license to future parties. The exclusive license binds the licen-
sor not to enlarge the scope of other licenses already granted or increase the number of
licenses.
3. 756 F.2d 1043, 1047 (4th Cir. 1985).
4. OEM stands for "Original Equipment Manufacturer," and VAR stands for "Value
Added Reseller." An OEM/VAR agreement is where a software developer agrees that a
software house or hardware manufacturer will distribute the developer's product in conjunc-
tion with other products (e.g., hardware, software or custom programming services) to be
added by the distributor.
5. These continuing duties may include: development work or manufacturing respon-
sibilities to be performed by one or both parties; some maintenance support by the distributor
with additional maintenance by the developer; accounting duties on the distributor to deter-
mine royalties due; exclusive period or markets; audit rights held by the developer; and cross
licensing of improvements (i.e., the developer gets to use distributor-developed improve-
ments). P. Hoffman, The Software Legal Book § 5.4 (1986).
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censed from soon-to-be bankrupt software houses. In other words,
the Lubrizol decision gives future software vendees a bargaining
chip to use against certain types of vendors while increasing the risk
that some current vendees might lose valuable software rights if
their licensors become bankrupt.
The statutory basis for the court's holding was § 365 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Section 365 permits a trustee in bankruptcy or
a debtor in possession to reject burdensome executory contracts.7
While this provision may seem necessary and easy to apply, the
Lubrizol decision is troublesome in two areas. First, the court de-
termined that an executory contract exists when a licensor owes
certain minimal, contingent duties and a licensee owes a duty of
accounting in addition to the mere obligation to pay money.8 Sec-
ond, the court found a benefit to the bankrupt licensor in the rejec-
tion of a nonexclusive license.9 On the basis of such findings,
rejection of the license was permitted.
This paper will first review the history of Section 365 so that
the reasonableness of the Lubrizol decision can be scrutinized. The
paper will then discuss the decision's effect on software licensing
and present arguments in favor of limiting the scope of Section 365
to preclude its application to such unique items as computer
software. Finally, the paper will present possible methods of negoti-
ating or drafting around the problems presented by the Lubrizol
decision.
II. THE CASE
Lubrizol involved the rejection in bankruptcy of a nonexclusive
license of a metal coating process technology from Richmond Metal
Finishers (RMF) to Lubrizol Enterprises (Lubrizol).'I Under the
terms of the license agreement, RMF (the licensor) was required to
notify Lubrizol (the licensee) of patent infringement actions involv-
ing the process and to defend it in those actions; to notify Lubrizol
of any subsequent licenses involving the same process; and to re-
duce Lubrizol's royalty rate if a lower rate was charged to the other
licensee(s). In addition, RMF was to indemnify Lubrizol for losses
arising in connection with any misrepresentation or breach of war-
6. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1985).
7. Id. at § 365(a).
8. 756 F.2d 1043, 1046 (4th Cir. 1985).
9. Id. at 1047.
10. Id. at 1045.
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ranty by RMF. 1 Lubrizol owed RMF the duty of accounting for
and paying royalties for use of the process and cancelling certain
existing indebtedness.12 Furthermore, Lubrizol was not to use the
process until May 1, 1983, and in fact, never did use the process.13
RMF filed a Chapter 11 petition for bankruptcy on August 16,
1983, and, as part of its plan for reorganization, sought to reject the
license agreement to facilitate sales or licenses to future custom-
ers. 14 The bankruptcy court ruled that the contract was executory
within the contemplation of 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) and permitted RMF
to reject the license. 5
On appeal, the district court determined that the contract was
not executory and, in any event, its rejection would not be advanta-
geous to the bankrupt.' 6 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed the district court's decision and reinstated the holding of the
bankruptcy court permitting RMF to reject the license. 17
The Court of Appeals employed a two-step test in arriving at
its decision. First, it decided whether the license agreement was
executory.' 8 Second, if it found the agreement to be executory, it
then sought to determine whether rejection would be advantageous
to the bankrupt.' 9
The Court of Appeals held that the license agreement was ex-
ecutory by employing Professor Countryman's definition of "execu-
tory."2 0  According to Professor Countryman, a contract is
executory if the "obligations of both the bankrupt and the other
party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of
either to complete the performance would constitute a material
breach excusing the performance of the other."'" In applying the
test, the court found the agreement executory as to RMF because it
owed the continuing duty of notifying Lubrizol of further licenses of
the process and of lowering Lubrizol's royalty rate if a lower rate
was charged for such licenses. In addition, the court found a con-
tinuing duty in RMF to apprise Lubrizol of any suits related to the
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1044.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1045.
19. Id. at 1046.
20. Id. at 1045.
21. Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439, 460
(1973).
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process and to defend and indemnify Lubrizol for any resulting
losses.22
The court also held that the contract was executory as to
Lubrizol by finding that Lubrizol owed the continuing duty of ac-
counting for and paying royalties to RMF.2 3 While the court ac-
knowledged that the mere obligation to make payments of money
does not make a contract executory, it held that the duties of
Lubrizol went beyond the traditional monetary payment in that the
accounting duty required Lubrizol to "deliver written quarterly
sales reports and [to] keep books of account subject to inspection by
an independent Certified Public Accountant."24 Since this duty was
held to go beyond mere debt, the license was determined to be exec-
utory as to Lubrizol.25 Thus, since the license agreement was exec-
utory within the meaning of § 365(a), the Court of Appeals reversed
the district court's contrary holding.
2 6
After deciding that the license was executory, the Court of Ap-
peals considered whether rejection of the license would serve the
bankrupt's business interests.27 The court began its analysis by rec-
ognizing the proposition that "the bankrupt's decision upon
[whether rejection would be advantageous] is to be accorded the
deference mandated by the sound business judgment rule as gener-
ally applied by courts to discretionary actions or decisions of corpo-
rate directors."28 In other words, the courts should not overturn
the trustee's decision absent a finding of bad faith or gross abuse of
"business discretion."29 Since the bankruptcy court failed to find
any bad faith, the district court could reverse only if that finding
was "clearly erroneous."'3° The Court of Appeals overturned the
district court's reversal because the court had failed to meet the
"clearly erroneous" standard and had merely substituted its busi-
22. 756 F.2d 1045, 1045 (4th Cir. 1985).
23. Id. at 1046.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. The court refers to NLRB v. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 523 (1984) (noting that the
business judgment rule is the "traditional" test); Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad, 318 U.S. 523, 550 (1943) (applying business judg-
ment rule to bankrupt's decision whether to affirm or reject lease); Control Data Corp. v.
Zelman (In re Minges), 602 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1979) (applying Institutional Investors
outside of railroad reorganizations); Carey v. Mobil Oil Corp. (In re Tilco, Inc.), 558 F.2d
1369, 1372-73 (10th Cir. 1977) (applying Institutional Investors to rejection of gas contracts).
29. 756 F.2d 1043, 1047 (4th Cir. 1985). See, eg., Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778,
782 (9th Cir. 1979); Polin v. Conduction Corp., 552 F.2d 797, 809 (8th Cir. 1977).
30. 756 F.2d 1043, 1047 (4th Cir. 1985).
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ness judgment for that of the debtor."'
The Court of Appeals concluded its opinion by setting out
Lubrizol's rights after rejection and then responding to Lubrizol's
policy arguments.32 Under 11 U.S.C. § 365(g), Lubrizol's only op-
tion was to treat the rejection as a breach and sue for money dam-
ages.33 It could not retain its contract rights and sue for specific
performance.34  Recognizing that there were policy arguments
against its decision, the court still dismissed them as typical of the
hazards created by § 365 for all businesses dealing with potential
bankrupts.35
On March 3, 1986, the United States Supreme Court denied
Lubrizol's petition for a writ of certiorari, thereby leaving intact the
Fourth Circuit's reversal. 36 Thus, RMF, a bankrupt licensor, was
permitted to reject its license agreement with Lubrizol as it was an
executory contract governed by Section 365 of the Bankruptcy
Code.
III. BACKGROUND
The bankruptcy system serves two primary objectives. The
first goal concerns economic rehabilitation of debtors by restructur-
ing the ratio between debts and assets or income.37 The second pur-
pose is to establish a forum for orderly and equitable distribution of
assets that optimizes recovery by creditors.3" Section 365(a) fur-
thers these objectives by permitting debtors to reject those execu-
tory contracts which are burdensome or unproductive while
completing those contracts which will provide a positive benefit to
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1048.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc., v. Canfield, 106 S.Ct. 1285 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1986) (No. 85-
863).
37. Nimmer, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Protecting the Fundamental Terms of
the Bargain, 54 U. CoLO. L. REv. 507, 509 (1983). The rationale for this goal can be de-
scribed in relatively pure economic terms, focused on the supposition that economic rehabili-
tation preserves or recreates a functioning economic entity that is able to participate in
economic exchange systems. Id. Furthermore, especially in business cases, rehabilitation
captures greater value for all concerned than would liquidation. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977), reprinted in 5 U.S. CODE CONT. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6179-80
(1978); S. REP. No 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5787, 5796 (1978).
38. Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc.
No. 137, part 1, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1973).
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the estate.39 In other words, the debts that would be created by
requiring a bankrupt debtor to perform unprofitable executory con-
tracts are reduced by permitting rejection. Furthermore, § 365(a)
allows bankrupt debtors to have the best of both worlds by also
permitting them to assume those contracts which will increase the
income to the estate.' By decreasing the amount of debt in this
way while maintaining the level of income to the estate, Section 365
increases the amount of money available to the estate. This fund is
then structured into payments to creditors in reorganization 41 or
distributed to creditors in liquidation. The end result is a more
favorable repayment schedule for creditors and a step towards eco-
nomic recovery for debtors.
Section 365 operates by allowing the bankruptcy trustee,42
"subject to the court's approval, [to] assume or reject any executory
contract.. .of the debtor."43 Thus, the bankruptcy trustee is per-
mitted to weigh the various costs and benefits of performing each
executory contract. Based on each analysis, he may choose to per-
form those contracts which will be beneficial to the estate while re-
jecting those which will produce a net loss or a burden on the estate.
The determinations are permitted on a case by case basis. In es-
sence, the option to assume or reject is analogous to the trustee's
right to abandon property which is burdensome or of inconsequen-
tial value to the estate.'
The general theme underlying Section 365 is that the bank-
rupt's interest in dispensing with burdensome or inconsequential
property outweighs any protectable interest that the nonbankrupt
may have in the executory contract. If the trustee chooses to reject
the contract, the nonbankrupt is limited to damages. Generally,
this means that the nonbankrupt will not be fully compensated for
his troubles and will be placed in the category of general creditors.
These general creditors, in turn will share in the misfortune of the
debtor's bankruptcy. Thus, although rejection of the contract is
analogous to repudiation and breach of the agreement (in which
case the nonbankrupt need not perform), his sole remedy is a claim
39. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982 & Supp. 111984).
40. Id.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982 & Supp. 111984) is called into question primarily in reorgani-
zation (Chapter 11) cases because the trustee in a liquidation (Chapter 7) case will generally
reject all executory contracts automatically. In other words, a nonexistent entity generally
does not have the option of assuming and continuing under its executory contracts.
42. In reorganization (Chapter 11) cases, the debtor generally serves as trustee and re-
tains control over the estate, but under the watchful eye of the creditors.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
44. Id. at § 554(a).
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for monetary damages. As a consequence, the nonbankrupt cannot
rely on any specific remedies provided for in the contract (e.g., spe-
cific performance).45
The threshold issue in applying Section 365 is determining
whether the contract is executory. The legislature has never estab-
lished a statutory definition of "executory" and therefore the defini-
tion must be developed by examining the cases in the bankruptcy
area. Basically, an executory contract is one in which performance
is due to some extent on both sides.4 Recently, the courts have
adopted Professor Countryman's more specific test in order to de-
termine whether a contract is executory.47 As noted earlier, accord-
ing to Professor Countryman, a contract is executory if the
"obligations of both the bankrupt and the other party to the con-
tract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete
the performance would constitute a material breach excusing the
performance of the other."48 This definition is consistent with the
case law except that a material breach may not be required.
A review of specific cases reveals how the definition of execu-
tory contracts applies to license agreements. It is clear that an ex-
clusive license agreement will make a contract executory as to the
party giving up his rights to the licensed technology.49 Further-
more, the judiciary has found that contingent duties are indicative
of an executory contract.5" For example, an obligation to defend
infringement suits gives rise to an executory contract as to the
promisor.51 While these provisions make a license agreement exec-
utory, one court has noted that mere payments of money will not
45. In re Waldron, 36 Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 633, 642 n.4 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984).
46. NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 518 n.6 (1984).
47. Gloria Manufacturing Corp. v. International Ladies' Garment Worker's Union, 734
F.2d 1020, 1022 (4th Cir. 1984).
48. Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439, 460
(1973).
49. Fenix Cattle Co. v. Silver (In re Select-A-Seat-Corp.), 625 F.2d 290, 292 (9th Cir.
1980). In In re Select-A-Seat, the court found that an obligation of a debtor to refrain from
selling software packages under an exclusive licensing agreement made a contract executory
as to the debtor notwithstanding the continuing obligation was only one of forbearance. Id.
Further, the court found that the obligation of the licensee to pay five percent of its annual
net income, in addition to the one-time license fee of $140,000, made the licensee's end of the
contract executory as well. Id.
50. In re Smith Jones, Inc., 26 Bankr. L. Rep. 289, 292 (Bankr. D.Minn. 1982).
51. In re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc., 23 Bankr. L. Rep. 104, 117 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1982). A clause placing an obligation on the promisor to defend infringement suits is a classic
example of a contingent duty which may make a contract executory. Such a clause typically
recites that the promisor is the owner of the licensed software and that he or she will defend
against any infringement suits brought by third parties claiming ownership in all or part of
the same software. Although the situation contemplated by the clause may never arise, the
1987]
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make a contract executory. 2 As discussed before, the Lubrizol
court carried this point a step further by recognizing that although
mere payments are not enough, an executory contract will arise as
to a licensee that owes an additional duty of accounting.5 3 While
the Lubrizol type of accounting duty is uncommon in typical end-
user software licenses, such a duty often aries in OEM/VAR agree-
ments and situations involving embedded software.5 4 Thus, an as-
sertion that all OEM/VAR agreements are executory contracts
would be consistent with the Lubrizol holding.
The judiciary has focused on the "court approval" element of
§ 365(a) since its inception. Various courts have attempted to de-
fine the extent of judicial review and the character of the economic
standard to be met in implementing a decision to reject executory
contracts. While some courts have required proof that the contract
is burdensome (e.g., costs exceed benefits),55 the vast majority have
deferred to the trustee's decision. However, the trustee must still
determine that rejection would benefit the general unsecured credi-
tors of the estate. 56 While the rights of the nonbankrupt licensee
may be considered, 57 rejection will be denied by the court only
when the damages to the nonbankrupt are disproportionate to any
benefit received by the unsecured creditors.58 The standard of re-
view for this decision is the "business judgment" test.5 9 Under this
test, the trustee's decision to reject will be upheld unless the court
finds bad faith or gross abuse of "business discretion."6 Finally,
the standard for appellate review of such a decision is the "clearly
erroneous" standard.61 Thus, it appears that a significant abuse of
discretion resulting in an actual loss to the estate must be estab-
lished before a trustee's decision to reject will be overturned.
judiciary still labels the duty as continuing. Consequently, the contract will be considered
executory as to the promisor.
52. In re Smith Jones, Inc., 26 Bankr. L. Rep. 289, 292 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982).
53. 756 F.2d 1043, 1046 (4th Cir. 1985).
54. "Imbedded software" describes the software added to a distributor's existing
software to make up a single software product. The developer of the imbedded software will
retain ownership of his part of the product and will receive royalties from the distributor
based on the amount and scope of licenses granted.
55. See, eg., In re Hurricane Elkhorn Coal Corp. II, 15 Bankr. L. Rep. 987 (Bankr.
W.D.Ky. 1981).
56. In re Florence Chi-Feng Huang, 23 B.R. 798, 801, 9 Bankr. Ct. Dec.(CRR) 972
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982).
57. Control Data Corp. v. Zelman (In re Minges), 602 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1979).
58. 9 Bankr. Ct. Dec.(CRR) at 974.
59. See supra note 27.
60. See supra note 28.
61. 602 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1979).
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Bankruptcy Code is designed to establish an efficient pro-
cedure in insolvency so that distressed debtors may receive a fresh
start. A strict application of Section 365 easily accomplishes this
internal goal by permitting the debtor to reevaluate his executory
contracts and unexpired leases so as to maximize the funds available
for distribution to creditors while minimizing burdensome obliga-
tions. A problem arises when this internal goal conflicts with the
external goal of encouraging certain types of voluntary transactions.
If the court permits rejection of executory contracts without look-
ing at the overall commercial effect, the result might weaken the
general social norm that honestly incurred obligations should be
voluntarily performed.
The Lubrizol court's extension of Section 365 conflicts with
several strong external policies. By finding that Lubrizol's account-
ing duty was executory, the court could conceivably render every
OEM/VAR agreement executory because such agreements gener-
ally require that the distributor maintain records of each license
granted so that the amount of royalties payable may be ascertained
and verified. The nonbankrupt's continued use of certain vital tech-
nology may weigh heavily against rejection. In these cases, the
trustee should be held to a higher standard before rejection is per-
mitted. In Lubrizol, the trustee should have been required to show
a clear benefit to the estate. Moreover, he should have been com-
pelled to show that future performance by RMF might result either
in a net loss to the estate or in a need to continue the business be-
yond the period that would be feasible for an orderly distribution of
assets. Based on the facts given, there would have been no net loss
to the estate because the license was nonexclusive and the debtor
was free to license the process to other licensees. Furthermore, the
trustee could not show a burden on the estate because RMF's con-
tinuing duties were minimal.
A. Contract Objectives
The law of contracts is based on a promotion of voluntary agree-
ments between parties. The value of a contract is enhanced signifi-
cantly when it represents good faith negotiations by the parties and
is enforceable with some degree of reliability. In this vein, parties
should be allowed the freedom to contract for those terms which
will further each party's business interests. Contractual remedies
should be permitted to further this goal where not inconsistent with
other significant policy objectives. This plan ensures that the in-
19871
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jured party will receive the benefit of its bargain in most situations
according to the contract's terms.
If negotiating is the key to a successful contract, then each
party's ultimate satisfaction will be directly proportional to his level
of bargaining strength. In turn, the financial stability of each party
directly and substantially affects each party's bargaining strength.
The value of the contract to each party is controlled by "the value
of the ultimate exchange discounted by the certainty or uncertainty
of performance by the other party."62 In a comment to Section 2-
609, the Uniform Commercial Code recognizes that:
A continuing sense of reliance and security that the promised
performance would be forthcoming when due, is an important
feature of the bargain. If either the willingness or the ability of a
party to perform declines materially. . .the other party is
threatened with the loss of substantial parity of what he has bar-
gained for.
63
In light of Section 365's impact on executory contracts, parties must
now ask whether bankruptcy is foreseeable during the term of a
negotiated contract. If no risk of bankruptcy is perceived, Section
365 will have no influence on a contract's enforceability. Thus, the
bankruptcy contingency is defined by what can happen in bank-
ruptcy and the extent to which bankruptcy is perceived to be likely.
The goals represented in the Bankruptcy Code should not be
entirely inconsistent with the goals of general contract law. Some of
the internal bankruptcy goals include optimal distribution to credi-
tors and giving insolvent debtors the chance for a fresh start. How-
ever, the Bankruptcy Code should also reflect the external goal of
keeping parties out of bankruptcy. It could enhance the ability of a
nonbankrupt but financially distressed debtor to engage in business
activities that would avoid bankruptcy. The Code can accomplish
this by not further weakening the bargaining position of a finan-
cially unstable party. Thus, courts which apply Section 365 must
balance the internal bankruptcy goals with the general contract
principles that encourage and reenforce the use of contractual
relationships.
As applied in the Lubrizol decision, Section 365 conflicts with
basic contract principles. The judiciary must recognize that Section
365 will affect contracts even if bankruptcy is never filed. For ex-
ample, the primary impact of Section 365 is felt by the smaller, fi-
nancially distressed debtor in that third parties may refuse to enter
62. Nimmer, supra note 37, at 516.
63. U.C.C. § 2-609, comment 1 (1980).
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into contractual relationships with them based on the fear that
bankruptcy will deny these parties the benefit of their bargain.
Moreover, even if these financially distressed entities are able to per-
suade third parties to deal with them, the cost in terms of a loss of
bargaining strength will be significantly increased.'
The Lubrizol decision will not affect general end-use license
agreements for computer software since such agreements are nonex-
ecutory and cannot be rejected. Although the vendor will typically
owe some continuing duties in standard end-user agreements such
as the contingent duty to defend the vendee in any infringement
actions, the vendee will generally not owe any continuing duties af-
ter the initial license fee has been paid. Such agreements are nonex-
ecutory and cannot be rejected. On the other hand, several types of
software agreements will almost always be executory and, thus, sub-
ject to the Lubrizol analysis. Virtually all OEM/VAR agreements
will be executory because the typical licensee owes a duty, not un-
like Lubrizol's, of accounting for further distributions of the
software and paying royalties based on the number and type of
licenses granted. Lubrizol would also apply to those licenses which
require the vendee to make certain improvements to the software
and then license those improvements back to the vendor. These sit-
uations are not uncommon in the software field and will almost al-
ways result in executory, and therefore rejectable contracts under
Lubrizol.
The major impact of the Lubrizol decision will fall on the
smaller vendors which license their software under one of the above
situations. These companies tend to exist solely to develop and li-
cense individual software products. They make their money by li-
censing their product to multiple users under license agreements
that may contain reciprocal duties similar to those involved in the
Lubrizol decision. Furthermore, they generally operate at a loss
during the development stages of the software. The problem arises
because license agreements are generally negotiated either prior to
or during this development stage and this is precisely the time when
Section 365's impact will be felt the greatest by these smaller
vendors.
64. To the extent that the value of a contract decreases, the affected party will have an
increasing incentive to negotiate terms or act in a manner that reduces the possibility of
nonperformance, limits the extent of that party's potentially adverse reliance on the promise,
or increases the value of the ultimate exchange to that party. Nimmer, supra note 37, at 521.
Often, these actions will increase the cost (or reduce the value) of the contract to the other
party. Id. Depending on the facts or the behavioral model employed, these adjustments may
lead to a refusal to undertake a contractual arrangement. Id.
1987]
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General contract norms do not provide the entire basis for lim-
iting the application of Section 365 when the continuing commer-
cial viability of small software vendors is at issue. A further reason
is that the ability of these parties to contract on commercially viable
terms might even be essential to any effort by them to avoid finan-
cial failure and eventual bankruptcy. So, if Lubrizol is applied
strictly, Section 365 will disrupt contract patterns and may actually
contribute to the likelihood of bankruptcy. Thus, the potential
snowball effect of the Lubrizol decision should be stopped before a
significant amount of damage is done to the computer industry.
B. The "Court Approval" Requirement
The Lubrizol case reversed the district court's holding under
the guise that it was protecting the trustee's right to exercise his
business judgment in deciding whether or not to reject RMF's li-
cense of Lubrizol. It held that the trustee's business judgment of
what constituted a burden on or a loss to the estate should be inter-
fered with only where "clearly erroneous."65 Even assuming the
business judgment standard was applied properly in this situation,
the basis for the court's holding could only have been that Lubrizol
failed to offer any contrary evidence at the bankruptcy court level
or that the district court failed to directly quote the term "clearly
erroneous." Under the facts given, the decision of the trustee in the
Lubrizol decision was clearly erroneous.
Rejection of the license to Lubrizol not only failed to reduce a
potential burden on the estate, it actually created a loss to the es-
tate. As discussed before, the license involved in the Lubrizol case
was non-exclusive. Under a typical non-exclusive license, the licen-
sor is free to license the technological process to other parties.
Thus, RMF could not argue that its license to Lubrizol reduced its
opportunities to contact further potential licensees unless additional
information was given. Such information might include an asser-
tion that the market for the process was so limited that by rejecting
the license to Lubrizol, greater opportunities would open up with
Lubrizol's competitors. Since the royalty payments appear to be
based on use, RMF could then assert that one or more of the com-
petitors would use the process more than Lubrizol. Such a situation
would produce a definite monetary benefit to the estate. However,
RMF apparently only argued that if it granted a license to a future
party for less than the license fee paid by Lubrizol, it would have to
65. 756 F.2d 1043, 1047 (4th Cir. 1985).
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reduce Lubrizol's royalty rate accordingly. In this situation, the
only resulting loss that would occur by continuing the Lubrizol li-
cense would be a reduction in the royalty amount paid by Lubrizol
alone. Following this line of reasoning, RMF's rejection would re-
sult in a greater loss to the estate in the amount of Lubrizol's entire
royalty payment. Although this discussion does not take into ac-
count the further duties RMF would owe if it continued the license
to Lubrizol,66 clauses of similar effect would probably be included
in any other license granted by RMF. Thus, they would not repre-
sent any increased burden upon the estate.
The current standards for judicial approval grant the trustee
substantial discretion in a decision to reject. While this approach
tends to optimize the value of estate, it also weakens the value of
any contractual promise made by a financially distressed debtor fac-
ing a significant risk of bankruptcy. As a result of the business
judgment standard and the reduced likelihood of court reversal, the
decision to reject may increase the cost and reduce the availability
of license agreements for such debtors, thereby actually contribut-
ing to further financial hardship.
The problems resulting from Lubrizol's interpretation of the
business judgment standard will be compounded when applied to
various types of licenses for specially designed computer software.
This raises the question of when a significant harm to a nonban-
krupt party should be allowed to override a trustee's decision to
reject a contract. Furthermore, while the business judgment stan-
dard may be acceptable with generally available items, it is gener-
ally inappropriate when dealing with such unique items as specially
designed software. In the situation of important, specially designed
software, the rejection standard should provide a greater assurance
of performance.
Under the general contract principles, the breach of a contract
for unique goods may result in the remedy of specific performance.
The Bankruptcy Code recognizes the importance of contracts for
unique items by removing real estate contracts from the general ap-
plication of Section 365.67 In those situations, a form of specific
performance is permitted. Certain computer software licenses are
no different from contracts for real estate in that the software may
be just as important and just as unique to the nonbankrupt party.
66. RMF would still have the contingent duty of notifying and defending any patent
infringement actions and indemnifying Lubrizol for any losses arising in connection with a
breach of warranty or misrepresentation. Id. at 1045.
67. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(h), (i) (1985).
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The Code should reflect this concern, or, alternatively, bankruptcy
judges should consider this situation when deciding whether or not
to approve rejection of a computer software license. Where the
nonbankrupt party's interest in continued use of the computer
software significantly outweighs any burden on the bankruptcy es-
tate and where there is no open commercially reasonable substitute
for the software, rejection should not be permitted.
The judicial approval requirement of Section 365 should also
be applied to minimize the impact on pre-bankruptcy bargaining for
computer software while avoiding substantial damage to other
bankruptcy interests. Although there should be no blanket grant of
specific performance, it should be allowed where certain conditions
are established. These factors could be reviewed at the "judicial
approval" stage of the bankruptcy proceedings. Professor Ray-
mond Nimmer has suggested a three factor test in determining
whether rejection should be approved or disapproved.6" First, will
performance be burdensome on the bankrupt estate?69 Here, the
court should look for any immediate economic loss to the estate
caused by future performance of the executory contract. Second, is
performance feasible?70 In this situation, no specific performance of
an agreement should be granted if performance would be impossi-
ble. This situation might arise in liquidation cases where the license
agreement provides for future maintenance. Third, what is the ex-
tent of the nonbankrupt's reliance on the contractual promise?71
Under these circumstances, reliance is construed broadly and the
court should merely ask whether the nonbankrupt has begun to act
on the promise or whether there are commercially viable alterna-
tives. If this test is applied before permitting rejection of computer
software licenses, the negative impact on small computer software
vendors will be greatly reduced.
V. DRAFrING AROuND LUBRIZOL
Lubrizol will probably not result in special sessions of the legis-
lature. Thus, it is important for computer lawyers to consider the
bankruptcy contingency in drafting any computer software license
agreements. Although there are no ironclad methods of avoiding
Section 365 and the rejection of executory contracts, there are sev-
eral possible options which might either limit the applicability of
68. Nimmer, supra note 58, at 529.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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Section 365 or reduce the potential harm to the vendee in the event
that rejection is permitted.
The source code of a computer program is the standard repre-
sentation of the instructions that cause a computer to execute a de-
sired function. It typically contains comments on the operation of
the software and enables a computer programmer to understand
how the software works. Thus, a software vendee may protect itself
by demanding the source code up front. However, such a demand
is generally inappropriate in negotiating a license to use standard
software because either the software is not significant enough to
warrant such a demand or the vendee may have neither the ability
nor the desire to perform maintenance using the source. On the
other hand, if the software is very important, the customer may be
justified in demanding access to the source code in the event that
the vendor goes bankrupt or fails to provide continued
maintenance.
Release of the source code also permits the vendee to make its
own modifications and improvements to the software. Thus, with
access to the source code, the vendee ensures itself of continued use
of the software. On the other hand, it also increases the likelihood
that the vendor's proprietary rights could be infringed. For these
reasons, vendors are very reluctant to release source codes to their
customers. This holds true whether the vendor is a large, well-es-
tablished software development firm or a small, financially unstable
software house. Thus, although the vendee may attempt to get the
source code, such a solution would be unlikely in the majority of
cases.
A well-drafted source code escrow agreement is perhaps the
best method a vendee can employ to protect itself if vendor bank-
ruptcy is a concern. An escrow arrangement allows the vendee to
obtain access to the source code if and when the vendor is unavaila-
ble to provide a copy to the vendee. However, such an arrangement
will only work if the escrow agreement is not an executory contract
for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.
One possible arrangement involves two documents: a non-ex-
ecutory escrow agreement 72 and a concededly executory license
agreement. In this situation, the license agreement provides the
general working relationship between the vendor and the vendee,
and is rejectable by the trustee as an executory contract. On the
other hand, the escrow agreement must only provide for the con-
72. For a general introduction to source code escrow agreements, see P. HOFFMAN,
THE SOFTWARE LEGAL BOOK § 2.42 (1987).
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tinuing duties owed by the escrow agent (stakeholder) and should
not be executory. Careful consideration must be given to the draft-
ing of the escrow agreement for this arrangement to work.
The escrow agreement will continue after bankruptcy only if
the vendor owes no continuing duties under the agreement. Thus,
the escrow agreement should only establish the responsibilities of
the stakeholder and the escrow fees should be paid up front. The
vendor obligation to deposit updated versions of the software into
escrow should not be in the agreement, nor should any requirements
be placed on the vendor with respect to the future deposits. Finally,
the vendor should not have any obligations with respect to release of
the software upon bankruptcy or failure to maintain. In sum, the
escrow agreement should be drafted so that the trustee cannot make
a successful argument that the vendee owes a continuing duty.
The escrow agreement can probably state that the vendor will
provide a list of vendees (potential distributees) to the stakeholder.
However, this clause must in no way place an obligation on the
vendor to keep such a list current. The burden should be on the
individual vendees to remind the vendor to update the stakeholder's
list. Thus, the actual clause in the escrow agreement will be read
more as an assertion by the vendor than as an obligation placed on
the vendor.
The source code will generally be transferred to the stake-
holder on some form of medium (e.g., tape, diskette, etc.). The
drafter of an escrow agreement should make certain that the stake-
holder has title to the medium even though the vendor will almost
invariably retain title to the source code. The purpose of such a
provision is to circumvent Section 542 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Section 542 gives the trustee the power to compel a third party in
possession of property of the estate to turn such property over to
the trustee.73 If the vendor owned the diskette in the stakeholder's
possession, the trustee could demand its return and frustrate the
purpose of the agreement. A stakeholder with title to the diskette is
then free to transfer it to the vendee upon the occurrence of the
stated conditions. It is important to note that the stakeholder does
not own the source code and therefore, cannot make copies of it
after the vendor enters bankruptcy. Thus, the stakeholder must be
holding enough copies to distribute to each of named vendees.
The escrow agreement should also contain a description of the
events which trigger a- release of the source code to the named vend-
73. 11 U.S.C. § 542 (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
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ees. Once again, this procedure should not place any obligations on
the vendor. However, notice and an opportunity to object (with
procedures for determining whether the triggering event has oc-
curred) given to the vendor should not make the agreement execu-
tory. Either the license agreement or the escrow agreement can
provide that each named vendee will receive information on the re-
lease events and procedure from the stakeholder.
To keep the escrow agreement from being deemed executory,
the drafter of the agreements must distinguish between a triggering
event and an obligation not causing default. Examples of trigger-
ing events include the appointment of a receiver for the vendor, the
filing of a petition for bankruptcy, and vendor failure to provide
required maintenance. The escrow agreement should stop with a
definition of these triggering events. The license agreement, on the
other hand, should actually set forth the vendor's obligation to
maintain the software, to remedy defects, and to deposit updated
versions of the software into escrow. The logic is that if the license
agreement is going to be deemed executory, it might as well be
executory.
A discussion of every provision that might go into a license
agreement or an escrow agreement is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. With desired additions, the drafter should just remember that
any obligations placed on the vendor should be in the license agree-
ment rather than in the escrow agreement. Vendor duties under the
escrow agreement should be limited to the initial payment of fees
and the initial deposit of the source code (with title to the medium
in the stakeholder). In this form, the agreements should protect the
vendee from loss in the event of vendor bankruptcy as long as the
drafter takes these general rules into account.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Lubrizol decision has a direct impact on the computer
software industry. Software vendees may be more reluctant to deal
with small software vendors whom they perceive to be financially
unstable. Alternatively, if the software is very important and vend-
ees can perform their own maintenance, they may escalate their de-
mand for source code or some type of escrow arrangement through
which they are guaranteed continued access to the source. Even if
the vendee does not have the luxury of shopping elsewhere or the
leverage to obtain the source code up front, the Lubrizol decision is
a warning that careful drafting should be employed during the ne-
gotiating process.
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The drafter should recognize that two distinct agreements are
required when the source code is to be placed in escrow. The first
will be a source code escrow agreement that cannot be interpreted
as executory. The drafter should take great pains in making sure
that the agreement is not executory by not including any provisions
that may be interpreted as placing a continuing duty on the vendor.
The second agreement is the concededly executory license agree-
ment which may contain all of the desired vendor duties. If this
distinction is recognized, the vendee should attain a higher level of
protection if the vendor is thrust into bankruptcy.
